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10.1  Introduction 
Denmark is an archetype of a Scandinavian welfare state. Although the gov- 
ernment plays virtually no direct role in the business sector, the public sector 
is large. An ambition of guaranteeing all residents a respectable living standard 
has been put into practice by providing collective insurance against temporary 
or permanent income losses. As a result, the public sector has a near monopoly 
in the production of children's day care, health care, and education. Old-age 
provision is also mainly in the hands of the public welfare system. A large 
number of transfer payments are offered without means testing, and benefits 
are in many cases unrelated to past contributions. Furthermore, taxes are only 
to a minor extent earmarked for any specific purpose. 
Such large-scale involvement of the public sector has recently come under at- 
tack from different angles (Drkze and Malinvaud 1994; Lindbeck et al. 1994). 
It has been argued that welfare programs may (1) undermine the incentives to 
work and thereby give rise to rigidities in the functioning of  labor markets; 
(2) increase the size of government and thereby raise the level of distortionary 
taxation, in turn constituting obstacles to economic efficiency and growth; and 
(3) lead to cumulative deficits and mounting public debts, thereby passing tax 
burdens onto future generations that, eventually, may threaten the fiscal sus- 
tainability of the welfare state.' This paper concentrates on the third issue: for 
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Denmark, we examine both the generational stance of current fiscal policy and 
the generational impact of various policy reforms. 
As in most other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, the (gross) public debt-to-GDP ratio in Denmark has risen 
quite dramatically over the past couple of decades, from about 5 percent in the 
early 1970s to about 72 percent in 1995. In addition, due to rising life expec- 
tancy and declining fertility, the Danish population is aging rapidly, as indi- 
cated by  the projected  rise of  nearly  30 percent in  the ratio of  elderly to 
working-age people from 1995 to 2030. Therefore, future generations of tax- 
payers may not only be burdened by  the costs of providing for an increasing 
number of elderly, they may also have to service a public debt that meanwhile 
might have grown large. 
In our discussion of  these issues we focus on the generational impact of a 
set of policies that are on the forefront of debate of fiscal policy in Denmark. 
These fall in three broad categories, namely, (1) a labor market reform with 
strong fiscal ingredients, aiming at bringing structural unemployment down; 
(2) a program of public debt reduction, designed in line with official medium- 
to long-term targets of  fiscal policy; and  (3) an  increase in the (effective) 
retirement  age, aiming  at tempering the effects of  population  aging. As  a 
benchmark for these appraisals we first compute the intergenerational distribu- 
tion of  tax burdens in a baseline scenario in which fiscal policy remains un- 
changed. 
From here we proceed as follows. Section 10.2 offers a brief introduction to 
the Danish tax and transfer system, and section 10.3 reflects on some topical 
themes in the debate on fiscal policy in Denmark. Section 10.4 presents our 
empirical base. The generational stance of current fiscal policy is reported in 
section 10.5, while section 10.6 evaluates the generational impact of the above- 
mentioned policy reforms. Finally, section 10.7 provides a brief summary and 
conclusions of the study. 
10.2  The Tax and Transfer System in Denmark 
The large involvement of the public sector in the Danish economy has led 
to a high level of taxation, The ratio of total tax revenue to GDP is around 50 
percent, among the highest in the European Union. However, it should be kept 
in mind that unlike Denmark, most EU countries pay transfers on a net-of-tax 
basis. Also, in some European countries household subsidies are given in the 
form of deductions from the tax base rather than through direct transfer pay- 
ments. For example, these factors have  been found to account for almost 5 
countries where the welfare state has been carried further than in most other countries in Western 
Europe. See Hagen et al. (1998) for a comparison of the fiscal systems in Scandinavia with those 
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percentage points of  the difference in gross tax rates between Denmark and 
Germany in 1991 (Ministry of Finance 1994a). 
The Danish tax structure differs from that in most other European countries. 
In particular, there are two notable differences. First, the contributions of em- 
ployers and employees count relatively more in the other European countries, 
and second, personal income taxes make up a significantly larger part of  tax 
revenue in Denmark than in Europe in general. Indeed, while the revenue from 
personal income taxes constitutes about half of total tax revenue in Denmark, 
the corresponding figure for the European Union as a whole is only about a 
quarter. On the other hand, while social security taxes (paid by employees and 
employers) only count for about 4 percent of total taxes in Denmark, the EU 
average is more than a quarter. The revenue collected from indirect taxes has 
in recent years converged on the European average, with indirect taxes consti- 
tuting about a third of total tax revenue. The value-added tax is by far the most 
important indirect tax, accounting for more than 50 percent of total indirect 
tax revenue. 
Denmark was the first Nordic country to move  away from the system of 
global income taxation, wherein a single progressive tax schedule is applied to 
the sum of the taxpayer’s income from all sources, toward a system of so-called 
dual income taxation, wherein the taxation of capital income is separated from 
the taxation of other sources of income (Serrensen 1994). Since much of private 
sector interest income benefits from special tax  concessions, while interest 
payments are fully deductible from taxable income, the capital income tax in 
Denmark yields a negative net revenue. 
On the expenditure side of public activity, the share of the core expenditures 
in the welfare state, such as education, health, and social security, account for 
about three-quarters of  all expenditures. It is notable that the share of public 
expenditures allocated to education and health has gone down over the past 
decades, while social security expenditures constitute a larger share, reflecting 
the rise in unemployment and a tendency toward earlier retirement over the 
period. 
The redistributive capacity of the Danish tax and transfer system is quite 
significant. Although the distribution of incomes between “rich” and “poor” is 
not particularly even before taxes and transfers, the distribution of disposable 
incomes is much more equal (Forster 1994). The redistributive effects of taxes 
and transfers are enhanced by the provision of public services, such as educa- 
tion and subsidized child care (OECD 1996). 
10.3  Current Debates on Fiscal Policy 
Tax reform was a key ingredient in a new policy package introduced in Janu- 
ary 1993. The reform was designed in the same spirit as most other recent tax 
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financed by  various measures to broaden  the tax base and to close existing 
loopholes. Furthermore, the fall in personal income tax rates was to a large 
extent financed by increases in energy taxes levied on the household sector and 
by the introduction of new taxes on refuse, water use, and sewage. From 1996 
these initiatives were supported by  taxes on the emission of  carbon dioxides 
and sulfur dioxides from the business sector. The reform thus marked an im- 
portant step toward a so-called green tax reform. 
A big theme in the current debate on fiscal policy involves the extent to 
which wage taxes can be further replaced by green taxes. In particular, would 
it be possible to reap a “double dividend” in the form of improvements to both 
the environment and employment? Recent academic research suggests such a 
switch may lower the efficiency of the tax system as a revenue-raising device. 
Also, the (intended) substitution of labor for polluting inputs may lower labor 
productivity. With rigid real wage adjustments, this may lead to higher unem- 
ployment. A further concern relates to the fact that so far only a few countries 
in the world impose green taxes on the business sector. Hence, there is a lively 
debate in Denmark on what impact these taxes would have on Danish compa- 
nies exposed to international competition (Koch 1996). 
Since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, fiscal policy in Denmark has to a 
large extent been conducted in accordance with the so-called convergence cri- 
teria. At first sight this may appear surprising since Denmark has already an- 
nounced that it will not participate in the final stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union in Europe. Nevertheless, the Danish government remains committed to 
the principles of nominal convergence and fiscal discipline. Indeed, these ob- 
jectives have been quite successfully accomplished, as witnessed by the fact 
that Denmark now satisfies all the convergence criteria. 
In spite of the recent success of  fiscal policy in Denmark, there are some 
longer term challenges raised by the Danish welfare provisions. The most im- 
portant challenge relates to the rather sharp increase that has been observed 
over the past couple of decades in the number of working-age people more or 
less dependent on public transfer payments. Not only has the number of un- 
employed increased, but there has also been a rising number of recipients of 
(1) early retirement pension, available to persons who for health or social rea- 
sons are unable to participate in the labor market; (2)  early retirement benefits, 
available to persons aged 60 or older; and (3) cash benefits, available to unin- 
sured unemployed persons from households with income and wealth below a 
certain threshold. 
Altogether, in 1995 around 10 percent of the labor force (2.8 million) were 
registered  as  unemployed,  and  about  18 percent  of  the  total  number  of 
working-age people (3.4 million) received some sort of income-compensating 
public transfer other than unemployment benefits. Hereof, about a third were 
recipients due to disabilities of various kinds, and a sixth were students. Hence, 
about 21 percent of the labor force (or 18 percent of all working-age people) 
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corresponding number in the early 1970s being almost negligible, two tenden- 
cies can thus be identified: the work force is retiring earlier, and a larger num- 
ber of low-skilled workers have been expelled from the labor market. While 
most analysts would agree that these tendencies are serious, there are different 
views of their significance. 
“Optimists” hold that rather than being associated with a dramatic increase 
in  de facto unemployment, the enormous rise in the number of  recipients of 
public transfers simply reflects a change in political priorities in favor of grant- 
ing public benefits to people who previously would have been provided for by 
family or other “local” safety nets, if provided for at all. Thus, although the 
rise in the number of working-age people receiving transfer payments should 
not be overlooked, the problem should not be overstressed either. Furthermore, 
along with expansion of welfare programs, optimists often refer to the fact that 
it has been possible to keep the employment rate fairly constant at 72 to 75 
percent (Callesen 1995). 
“Pessimists,” on the other hand, tend to claim that not only has the rise in 
expenditures allocated to public transfers led to higher (marginal) tax rates, 
but it has also led to cuts in the proportion of expenditures allocated to public 
consumption and provision of various services. While high marginal tax rates 
are well known to have distortionary effects, a continuous fall in the share of 
expenditures to public service production and infrastructure relative to public 
transfer payments to  persons  out  of  employment  may  in  the  longer term 
threaten the legitimacy of the welfare state. For example, middle-class people 
may perceive their “return” from contributing to large-scale transfer payments 
as too low; a dissatisfaction that subsequently may translate into increased sup- 
port for political forces completely opposed to the fundamental structures of 
the welfare state (Ingerslev and Ploug 1996). 
The ongoing process of population aging has also reached the policy agenda 
(Jensen and Nielsen  1995). Unlike most  other OECD countries, Denmark 
seems to be offered demographic “breathing space”: over the next 10 years or 
so the ratio of elderly (age 65 +)  to working-age people (ages 20-64)  is falling, 
whereupon it increases rather dramatically. While the generational aspects of 
this phenomenon are widely recognized, there are different views on what 
should be done. Optimists argue that the problem will only show up far in the 
future, and that a successful economic policy in the meantime may  reverse 
the current tendency to early retirement. Pessimists, on the other hand, have 
emphasized the need for a strong commitment to eliminate the public sector’s 
debt during the breathing space and argue that the population should be more 
directly confronted with the need for a higher retirement age in the future. 
After this brief review of the state of play of  fiscal policy in Denmark, we 
next study the generational impact of alternative policies that may be adopted 
in the near future. As a benchmark we  first present generational accounts in 
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Table 10.1  Public Receipts and Expenditures in Denmark, 1995 (millions of dollars) 
Receipts 
Labor income taxes 
Capital income taxes 
Value-added taxes 
Alcohol and tobacco tax 
Gasoline tax 
Vehicle tax 
















Total  97,920 
Expenditures 
Social security  18,653 
Health insurance  10,362 
Unemployment insurance  5,293 
Welfare and housing  5,016 
Child and youth support  5,402 
Education  10.267 
Other transfers  9,580 
Net investments  I ,42  1 
Subsidies  5,072 
Government consumption  15,924 
Total  97,919 
Long-term care  5,594 
Net interest payments  5,335 
Sources: Danrnarks Statistik (1996) and data provided by the Danish Ministry of  Finance. 
10.4  Data 
The calculation of generational accounts for current and future generations 
requires (1) a long-term gender-specific population projection, (2) an aggre- 
gate government budget in a base year, (3) microprofiles (age and gender spe- 
cific) of net taxes to be paid over remaining lifetimes, and (4) an estimate of the 
government’s initial net debt position. Finally, assumptions about exogenous 
parameters,  including  the  GDP growth  rate  and  the  real  interest rate,  are 
needed (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 199  1). 
The population projections start in  1995. We have retained all assumptions 
about fertility, mortality, and net immigration made in the official Danish popu- 
lation projections. While the end year of  the official projections is 2040, our 
projections run through year 2200. During the first five years of the projection 
period, the total fertility rate is assumed to increase from 1.8 to 1.9, and it re- 
mains constant at that level from year 2000 onward. Since for females (males) 
younger than age 50 (65), the mortality rates are assumed to fall during the 
first 10 years of the projection period, life expectancy at birth rises from 77.9 
years (72.7) to 78.1 (73.0) for females (males). Finally, as to the immigration 
numbers, the official assumptions imply an annual net inflow of  13,500 per- 
sons, about 0.25 percent of the base-year population. 
The aggregates of taxes and transfers are taken from the official statistics 
on Danish national income and product accounts (Danmarks Statistik  1996; 
Ministry of Finance 1996). Table 10.1 summarizes the overall public budget of 
the base year 1995 in detail. The entire budget includes expenditures and re- 
ceipts of the federal and local governments as well as public enterprises. All 
intergovernmental payments have been canceled out. 
Public revenues include taxes on labor income, capital income, property, 
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contributions, the value-added tax, and other taxes or general revenues.* Note 
that capital income taxes are significantly negative, mainly due to a generous 
system of tax deductions on owner-occupied housing expenditures. Table 10.1 
also lists various transfer payments, including transfers for social security, 
health care, unemployment insurance, welfare and housing benefits, child and 
youth support payments, education, and long-term care expenditures as well 
as other transfers to households and subsidies. 
Each aggregate for taxes and transfers is allocated to the representative male 
and female individuals of each living generation with the help of relative age- 
gender profiles. Age-specific profiles originate from various Danish microdata 
surveys. Those taxes and transfers that have not been distributed by  age and 
gender are summarized under other taxes, revenues, or transfers. This is also 
true for the specific parts of taxes not being entirely distributed due to standard 
incidence a~sumptions.~ 
According to official Danish statistics, the government’s net financial debt 
amounts to $61.7 billi~n.~  To this number we add a real debt of $33.5 billion, 
resulting from a present value calculation of deficits from publicly owned en- 
terprises, land, and so forth. Note that this approach excludes public infrastruc- 
ture, which is provided without user fees. Our estimate of the government’s net 
wealth is thus -$95.2  billion. 
Net investment amounts to $1.42 billion. Hence, in the base year, the resid- 
ual of  total government revenues minus expenditures on transfers, subsidies, 
and net investments-that  is, government consumption-amounts  to $15.9 
billion. However, this number is not used in the calculations. There we con- 
structed a gross figure by  including non-age-specific distributed taxes, reve- 
nues and transfers, subsidies, net investments, and transfers to the rest of the 
world. This number is projected to grow in line with GDP, and it is adjusted 
for the demographic transition in a per capita manner. 
10.5  Basic Findings 
Table  10.2 reports generational accounts for cohorts ranging in age from 0 
to 90 in the base year 1995. The accounts are shown both for the case in which 
educational expenditures are allocated as a transfer payment on age groups and 
2. The aggregate for labor income taxes includes income of the self-employed. The aggregate 
of unemployment insurance covers both employers’ and employees’ contributions. 
3. In particular, this concerns about a quarter of gasoline and vehicle taxes, which are allocated 
to the firm  sector. Income of the self-employed is not divided into hypothetical shares of labor and 
capital income. Although this is in contrast to standard incidence, the splitting would be meaning- 
less in the light of  the capital income profile, which is dominated by  tax deductions for owner- 
occupied housing. Corporate taxes are distributed uniformly across age and gender. This is due to 
the lack of true information about the incidence of corporate taxes in Denmark. 
4.  Although future generations should only be burdened by  the service payments, and not be 
made responsible for the principal, a present value approach focusing exclusively on the debt 
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Table 10.2  Generational Accounts of Current and Future Generations: Baseline 
(thousands of US.  dollars) 
Education as Government 
Education as Transfers  Consumption 
Generation’s 
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the case in which education is treated as a form of government consumption. 
Furthermore, the accounts are presented for males and females combined and 
for males and females separately. The results refer to baseline assumptions, 
including an annual real GDP growth rate of  1.5 percent and an exogenous 
real interest rate of 5 percent. 
The first remarkable result is that if education is counted as a transfer, the 
generational account of a current newborn is negative. Since net payments to 
the government are strictly negative throughout childhood and youth, the ac- 
counts steadily increase until a peak is reached at age 25. Over the years of 
active labor market participation, the generational accounts are positive but 
falling, before turning negative as individuals approach retirement. Retirees 
obviously have negative accounts since they pay low income taxes and receive 
public pensions and other old-age services. 
The accounts also reveal big gender-specific differences underlying the av- 
erage figures. Indeed, while newborn males have  a generational account of 
$35,000, that of a newborn female is negative (-$73,000).  To understand this 
difference between the two sexes-a  remarkable one by  international stan- 
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First, a newborn male in  1995 would over his entire life span contribute 
about 40 percent more in labor income taxes than his female counterpart. The 
reason for this is that in spite of their relatively high labor market participation 
rate, Danish women are mostly recruited to low-wage and part-time jobs. Sec- 
ond, women receive more old-age pensions than men. Since the benefit rate is 
unrelated to gender, this clearly reflects the fact that women have, on average, 
longer lifetimes than men. For the same reason the present value of women’s 
transfers in the form of old-age care is higher than the corresponding number 
for men. Third, as a consequence of the fact that women are more exposed to 
unemployment than men, they receive relatively more unemployment and cash 
benefits. Fourth, women’s receipts of health insurance and other welfare ser- 
vices by far dominate what men receive. 
These patterns are modified considerably if expenditures on education are 
treated as government consumption. In general, this would increase the genera- 
tional accounts of  current newborns and future generations; indeed, current 
newborns and future generations would have their accounts increased by the 
same amount (when adjusted for productivity growth). Since education is con- 
centrated on children and youth, and only differs marginally across gender, this 
alternative accounting would leave the older generations unaffected. However, 
massive changes are observed for younger people (ages 0-15).  In particular, 
the generational accounts of current newborns (of both sexes) now become 
positive. 
Following standard practice, the distribution of net tax burdens between cur- 
rent and future generations is assessed in terms of  IT  = (1 + r)GA,,,+J( l  + 
g)GA,,, where GAJGA,,,,  I)  is the generational account of current newborns 
(individuals born in the subsequent year), r is the real interest rate, and g  is the 
real  GDP growth rate.  Generational balance, in the sense that existing and 
future generations are burdened equally, is achieved when this indicator equals 
unity. Similarly, if the indicator is greater (smaller) than unity, future genera- 
tions have to pay higher (lower) net taxes than current  generation^.^ 
There are two circumstances in which IT  does not yield meaningful results. 
First, as GA,,  approaches zero, T would indicate an infinite redistribution to 
the advantage of current generations. Such an outcome would clearly be diffi- 
cult to interpret. Second, problems arise if the accounts of current and future 
generations display changing signs. However, this is due to the fact that T can 
be substantially biased by gender-specific redistribution (Raffelhuschen 1995). 
Both of these problems actually occurred in an earlier study on generational 
accounting in Denmark (Jensen and Raffelhuschen 1997). 
The problem of changing signs depends crucially on how we treat educa- 
tional expenditures. Table 10.3 reports the baseline findings as well as their 
sensitivity with respect to realistic parameter variations.  Only if education is 
5.  71 = 1  is also necessary for maintaining a steady state corresponding to Kotlikoff‘s (chap. 1 
in this volume) fiscal balance rule. Table 10.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
~~~ 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7 
Generational accounts, education treated as government consumption 
Newborns in base year  156  66  17 
GA,,,, ,(  1 +  rYGA,,,(  1 +R)  1.28  1.62  2.98 
Newborns in base year  29  -29  -  56 
Future generations  74  13  -  20 
Future generations  196  103  49 
Generational accounts, education treated as transfers 
Achieving generational balance, education treated as transfers 
Cut in government purchases  29.2  27.3  24.4 
Reducing all transfers  4.4  4.2  3.8 
Increasing all taxes  4.0  3.8  3.4 
Achieving generational balance, education treated as government consumption 
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included in government consumption does IT  represent an unbiased indicator 
of intergenerational imbalance. In this case, and under baseline parameteriza- 
tion, our results suggest that the net tax burdens of future generations will be 
52 percent higher than for current generations. A lower discount rate and a 
higher growth rate both serve to reduce this generational imbalance. The quan- 
titative robustness  seems to be fairly low, as witnessed by the fact that  for 
combinations of three real interest rates (3,5, and 7 percent) with three alterna- 
tive GDP growth rates (1, 1.5, and 2 percent), the intergenerational imbalance 
ranges between 20 and 200 percent. However, the qualitative  finding of  an 
imbalance in favor of  currently living generations is robust. Table 10.3 also 
shows that if educational costs are counted as transfers, IT  cannot be given a 
meaningful interpretation. 
In view of the fundamental problems with IT, we present the magnitude of 
intergenerational imbalance with the help of an alternative set of indicators. 
These indicators show how much fiscal policy should be changed in order to 
eliminate the  “excess burden” on future generations. Specifically, we try to 
estimate the (immediate and permanent)  adjustment of (1) all taxes,  (2)  all 
transfer payments, and (3) all government purchases of goods and services that 
would be needed  to ensure equality between the net tax payments of future 
generations and the (growth-adjusted) net tax payments of newborns (TT = 1). 
The results are found in table 10.3, both for the baseline and for alternative 
combinations of interest rate and growth rate. The table shows the necessary 
fiscal adjustments, reported as percentage differences from what the relevant 
tax revenue or expenditure level would have been in the absence of these ad- 
justments. 
Consider first a policy whereby intergenerational balance is restored through 
higher overall tax revenue collected from living generations. In this case addi- 
tional revenue equal to 4.0 percent of the existing tax revenue is required. This 
is a nonnegligible fiscal adjustment. The net tax payments of current newborns 
and future generations could also be equalized if all transfer payments were 
reduced by 4.5 percent, or through an across-the-board cut in government ex- 
penditures of 29.0 percent. 
It is noteworthy that the required fiscal tightening is fairly robust to parame- 
ter variation, ranging within a band of ?  15 percent of the baseline finding. As 
seen from the last row in table 10.3, the strong sensitivity of measuring imbal- 
ance via the indicator TT  translates into rather robust qualitative findings if we 
focus on, for example, necessary  cuts in government purchases, also for the 
case of treating education as government consumption. Note that the scale of 
these cuts differs from those found in the case in which we distributed educa- 
tional expenditures due to the different denominators referred to in both cases. 
An important question is what difference it makes whether generational bal- 
ance is achieved in one way or another. Indeed, the macroeconomic response 
to a tax  increase  may  be different from the macroeconomic  response  to a 
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through higher income taxes, the wage and employment effects may differ sig- 
nificantly from the case in which fiscal policy is tightened through higher con- 
sumption taxes (Jensen  1997). However, generational accounting fails to cap- 
ture such differences. Nevertheless, it would be of interest to see how sensitive 
the generational accounts of existing generations are to the specific way of re- 
storing generational balance. Table 10.4 shows the generational accounts by age 
for current  as well  as for future  generations  under  each  alternative  policy 
change. For comparison we also show the baseline generational accounts. 
Let us first see how sensitive the generational accounts of existing genera- 
tions are to whether the generational balance is restored through higher taxes 
or lower transfers. Although almost identical total revenue, measured in pres- 
ent value, has to be raised in the two scenarios, and although all living genera- 
tions have to pay higher net taxes, the distribution of burdens across current 
generations appears to be quite sensitive to the choice of fiscal instrument. In 
general, higher tax rates place the fiscal burden on current generations of work- 
ing age, whereas transfer reductions mainly hit the younger and the older gen- 
erations. If generational balance is restored through an across-the-board cut 
in government expenditures, there would only be a direct influence on future 
generations’  net tax payments.  However, while the generational accounts of 
currently living generations are left unaffected, there would be an indirect ef- 
fect in the sense that the utilities derived from use of infrastructure, defense, 
policing, and so forth, would fall. 
In the light of these  findings  it would  be useful  to know  the sources of 
the  generational  imbalance  and  their  quantitative  significance.  Two  main 
sources can be identified, namely, demographic changes and preexisting public 
debt. Suppose education is counted as government consumption. In this case 
we find that if the age structure could be kept constant, future generations’ net 
payments  would be  11 percent less than those of current newborns. Hence, 
changing demographics have a lot to say. Similarly, in the absence of any public 
debt in the base year, future generations would only have to bear a 13 percent 
higher burden than current generations. As compared to the baseline results, 
we can thus conclude that both sources have more or less the same quantita- 
tive impact. 
10.6  Generational Impact of Policy Reforms 
Given the current debt position and given the underlying demographic pro- 
jections, current fiscal policy does pass burdens onto future generations. How- 
ever, in the case of no demographic change, that is, if the number of persons 
in each age group could be kept constant, or the case of no public debt in 1995, 
there would almost be generational balance.  Since neither of these  alterna- 
tives-keeping  the  age structure constant or getting rid of  public debt in a 
jiffy-can  be readily implemented, it might be of interest to consider some 
less ambitious policy changes that would mitigate the generational imbalance. Table 10.4  Achieving Generational Balance (thousands of US. dollars) 
Education Treated as Transfers  Education Treated as Government Consumption 
All  Government  All  Government 
Consumption  Transfers  Baseline  All Taxes  Transfers  Consumption  Baseline  All Taxes 
Decreasehncrease 
in expenditure/tax 
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Three alternative scenarios are considered, each of which is designed with a 
view to important themes in the current debate on fiscal policy in Denmark.h 
The first scenario (A) is based on rather optimistic assumptions about the 
Danish economy. Think of this as a successful outcome of the tax and labor 
market reforms introduced in recent years. Indeed, these reforms have been 
motivated by  a need for stimulating incentives to work and thereby bringing 
structural unemployment down. The year  1993 marked the starting point of 
an expansion in the Danish economy, with rather impressive growth in output 
and falling rates of unemployment. For example, the registered rate of unem- 
ployment has fallen by 3 percentage points since 1994. The question now is 
whether this is a process likely to continue. It is widely believed that if further 
underpinned by structural policy adjustments, additional inroads can be made 
in the number of unemployed. 
Following this line of reasoning, the rate of unemployment is assumed to 
fall by  a total of  3.4 percentage points over the years  1996-99.  Due to the 
operation of built-in fiscal stabilizers, an increase in employment not only re- 
duces expenditures on unemployment and cash benefits, it also leads to higher 
tax revenues. In our calculations we use official estimates (Ministry of Finance 
1994b) of the budgetary effects of a fall in the rate of Unemployment. Since a 
better performance  of the economy automatically improves  the government 
budget, the question arises whether the extra revenue should solely be used to 
reduce public debt, or whether it should also translate into a fall in the tax 
burden on living generations. 
We assume that over a period of  15 years, that is, until the year 2010, the 
extra revenue is used to reduce the government’s financial net debt, and there 
will be no discretionary fiscal adjustment  (such as a cut in tax rates). As a 
result, the public debt, amounting to $61.7 billion in 1995, would be eliminated 
by the year 2007. By the end of the year 2010 the government will have accu- 
mulated a net financial asset position of $14.7 billion. In view of the strength of 
public finances in the year 201 1, two alternative subscenarios are considered. 
Scenario A- 1 assumes that the process of government financial asset accumula- 
tion simply continues, while scenario A-2 assumes that a permanent tax cut is 
implemented so as to ensure that the level of  the government’s net financial 
assets can be kept constant in all future years. 
The effects of  scenario A are reported in table 10.5. In the absence of any 
discretionary action (A- 1), the generational accounts of living generations are 
seen to increase relative to the baseline findings. People of working age face 
the highest  increases in  tax  payments, whereas the  effects on the elderly’s 
accounts are relatively  minor, due to the adjustment of transfer aggregates. 
The benefits resulting from a better economic performance  accrue to future 
6. As mentioned already, it should be stressed that the implementation of reform measures can 
involve significant macroeconomic feedbacks that are not taken into account (Buiter 1995; Fehr 
and Kotlikoff, chap. 3 in this volume; Raffelhiischen and Risa 1997). Table 10.5  Generational  Accounts for Alternative Policies (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Labor Market Reform  Reducing Government Activity 
Endogenous Debt  Reduced Income  Endogenous Debt  Reduced Income  Higher 
Generation’s  after 2010  Tax  after 2010  after 20 10  Tax after 20 I0  Retirement Age 
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generations, which turn out to be even better off than current newborns. In 
fact, instead of paying $26,000, as in the baseline scenario, they now receive 
$20,000. Moreover, to restore generational balance it would be necessary  to 
increase government purchases by  14.2 percent, against a cut of 29 percent as 
in the baseline. Of course, one would also expect that living generations reap 
some benefits of successful macroeconomic  performance.  For example, the 
higher employment rate would undoubtedly be felt as an improvement in living 
conditions of those previously unemployed. 
More balanced  generational results  would clearly come out if  taxes were 
lowered in 2011 (A-2). In this case some but not the entire benefits of labor 
market reforms would accrue to future generations. For current generations, 
the future income tax relief  will thus imply that their accounts range about 
halfway between the baseline and scenario A- 1. The same holds true for future 
generations. Hence, achieving generational balance in scenario A-2 necessi- 
tates a moderate cut in government consumption of 7.8 percent. 
Scenario B is based on less optimistic assumptions about the effects of struc- 
tural reforms and the international conjuncture. In particular,  the unemploy- 
ment rate is assumed to remain at its 1995 level. Yet we assume that policy- 
makers have equally ambitious public debt targets. Indeed, the Danish govern- 
ment has taken the official position that that public debt should be eliminated 
over the next 10 to 15 years (Lykketoft 1995).  We now let scenario A constitute 
a benchmark for the design of fiscal policy in scenario B. However, rather than 
getting rid of public debt through automatic stabilization, debt reduction now 
has to be implemented through discretionary fiscal initiatives. We assume this 
is achieved through (proportional) contributions from all parts making up the 
government budget. In view of its breathing space, alluded to above, Denmark 
seems to have a unique opportunity to bring down public debt relatively fast, 
although a horizon of  15 years may seem a bit too ambitious. 
This scenario will necessarily impose significant burdens on current genera- 
tions. However, as before the distribution of tax burdens between current and 
future generations depends on what happens when the public debt target has 
been reached in 2010. In scenario B-1 we assume that the policy of debt reduc- 
tion (or asset accumulation) is continued after the year 2010. As  compared to 
scenario A-1, we of course find the same net payments for future generations 
and current newborns as well as the same increase of government  purchase 
necessary  to ensure generational balance.  Moreover, young working-age  co- 
horts will gain while old working-age and elderly cohorts lose. As compared 
to our baseline results, all cohorts will realize lower transfer receipts and there- 
fore higher accounts. Clearly, this strategy would be advantageous solely for 
future generations.  Scenario B-2 is designed  with  the  aim of  sharing more 
equally the changes in net tax payments between current and future genera- 
tions. Hence, we assume that taxes are cut in 2011, with the magnitude being 
determined such that the debt ratio arrived at in 2010 can be kept constant 
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The results from scenario B-2 are also shown in table 10.5. Again, as com- 
pared to scenario A-2 only the accounts of those at least one year old in the 
base year are affected, and it will be the young who gain. In comparison to 
scenario B-1 no generation is worse off, while relative to our baseline, every 
cohort except those aged 15 to 25 in the base year will be worse off. Note that 
the gaining cohorts suffer transfer losses only for a few years right after 1995 
as well as in the far future, while the income tax effect in year 2010 is high in 
terms of present value. 
The third strategy (C) relates to initiatives to avert the old-age crisis. While 
the need for debt reduction is well perceived across a broad political spectrum 
in Denmark (although its specific form of implementation remains controver- 
sial), views certainly differ as to whether debt reduction is enough to combat 
the underlying pressure on public finances due to population aging. Against 
this background a strategy is considered with the purpose of  reversing the 
strong tendency toward early retirement. This strategy is designed as a reform 
of the early retirement scheme, currently allowing members of the workforce 
to retire at age 60. Instead, we examine the generational impact of raising that 
age stepwise to 63 through the years 2000-2002.  Clearly, this announced re- 
form would yield a “double dividend”: not only would the workforce be ex- 
panded, there would also be a fall in the large number of recipients of public 
transfer payments. 
Table 10.5 reports the generational impacts of  scenario C while adjusting 
solely early retirement benefits and income tax revenues. As compared to the 
baseline findings, the burden of current generations will rise with age while the 
current elderly remain basically unaffected. With respect to intergenerational 
redistribution, we  find a significantly reduced burden on future generations. 
This holds for both absolute net payments amounting to $2,000 instead of 
$26,000 and for the 8 percent cut in government purchases necessary to ensure 
generational balance. In fact, reducing the retirement age is a very effective and 
adequate way of achieving generational balance under the given demographic 
pressure. One should keep in mind, though, that it will predominantly burden 
older and therefore-in  terms of  life cycle planning-not  very flexible co- 
horts. Hence, a fair and longsighted announcement has to be part of that type 
of reform. 
10.7  Conclusion 
Using the device of generational accounting, we find that there actually is a 
generational imbalance associated with  current fiscal policy  in  Denmark. 
Therefore, current generations would have to face tighter fiscal policies if the 
generational distribution of  net tax burdens were to be more equal. For ex- 
ample, generational balance could be achieved through an increase in income 
tax revenue of almost 4.0 percent or a cut in transfer payments of around 4.5 
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results suggest that the (growth-adjusted) lifetime net tax payments of a repre- 
sentative member of future generations will be around 50 percent higher than 
those faced by current newborns. 
We also assess the generational impact of a number of other policies that are 
important on the policy  agenda in  Denmark. In particular,  the prospects of 
future generations would look much lighter if public debt were reduced in line 
with official declarations of intent, implying that public debt would be elimi- 
nated over the next  10 to 15 years. Also, initiatives to expand the workforce, 
including steps to bring down the large number of  recipients of early retire- 
ment benefits,  could add a significant contribution to restoring generational 
equity.  Furthermore,  a  fall  in  structural  unemployment,  as  accomplished 
through, say, tax and labor market reforms, would not only be good for the 
unemployed but would also benefit future generations significantly. 
Another notable finding of  the paper is that not only do men contribute a 
much larger share of  their lifetime incomes to the government than women, 
womens’ net payments  are even negative. There are several reasons for this 
result, unique  by  international  standards. For example,  Danish  women  are 
mainly recruited to low-paid jobs with higher risks of unemployment; a num- 
ber of  services provided by the Danish welfare system are mainly utilized by 
women; and Danish women have a greater longevity than men, which implies 
that they receive public pensions and other old-age benefits for a longer period 
than men. This bias is aggravated by the flat-rate nature of  the Danish pen- 
sion scheme, 
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